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Abstract Despite the availability of very detailed data on financial market, agent-based
modeling is hindered by the lack of information about real trader behavior. This makes
it impossible to validate agent-based models, which are thus reverse-engineering attempts.
This work is a contribution to the building of a set of stylized facts about the traders
themselves. Using the client database of Swissquote Bank SA, the largest on-line Swiss
broker, we find empirical relationships between turnover, account values and the number
of assets in which a trader is invested. A theory based on simple mean-variance portfolio
optimization that crucially includes variable transaction costs is able to reproduce faithfully
the observed behaviors. We finally argue that our results bring into light the collective
ability of a population to construct a mean-variance portfolio that takes into account the
structure of transaction costs.
Early results in connexion with this project have been presented at the Fribourg Symposium (Oct.
2008, unifr.ch/econophysics/symposium), the Tokyo APFA7 Workshop (Feb. 2009, thic-apfa7.com), the
EPFL Alliance Carrefour (Mar. 2009, alliance-tt.ch/Carrefours), and the Zurich Workshop on Complex
Socio-Economic Systems (Jun. 2009, soms.ethz.ch/workshop2009).
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2 Traders’ collective portfolio optimization with transaction costs
1 Introduction
The availability of large data sets on financial markets is one of the main reasons behind the
number and variety of works devoted to their analysis in various fields, and especially so in
Econophysics since physicists much prefer to deal with very large data sets. At the macro-
scopic level, the analysis of millions of tick-by-tick data points uncovered striking regularities
of price, volume, volatility, and order book dynamics (see [28, 7, 19, 5] for reviews). Since
these phenomena are caused by the behavior of individual traders, news, and the interplay
between the two, finding a microscopic mechanism that allows agent-based models to repro-
duce some of these stylized facts is an important endeavor meant to give us insight on the
causes for large fluctuations, be it herding [18], competition for predictability [13], portfolio
optimization leading to market instability [30], or chaotic transitions [9].
Market phenomenology appears as a typical example of collective phenomena to the eyes
of statistical physicists. Thus, the temptation to regard the numerous power-laws found in
empirical works as signatures of criticality is intense. But if the former are really due to a
phase transition, one wishes at least to know what the phases are, which is hard to guess from
the data alone. According to early herding theoretical models [18], the phase transition may
lie in the density of social communication and imitation, and is of percolation type, thereby
linking power-law distributed price and volume, criticality and agent-behavior. The standard
Minority Game [15] has also a single phase transition point where market predictability is
entirely removed by the agents, without any specular effect on price and volume; on the other
hand, grand-canonical MGs [33, 25, 11, 12] that allow the agents not to play have a semi-line
of critical points that do produce stylized facts of price, volume and volatility dynamics; in
the framework of statistical physics, the phase transition is due to symmetry breaking, i.e.,
it is a transition between predictable and perfectly efficient markets; this also suggests that
the emergence of large fluctuations is due to market efficiency.
There are of course many other possible origins of power-laws in financial markets that have
nothing to do with a second order phase transition. The simplest mechanism is to consider
multiplicative random walks with a reflecting boundary [29]. Long-range memory of volatility
is well-reproduced in agent-based models whose agents act or do nothing depending on a
criterion based on a random walk [6]. Assuming pre-existing power-law distributed wealth,
an effective theory of market phenomenology links the distributions of price returns, volume,
and trader wealth [23]. On the other hand, markets are able to produce power-law distributed
price returns by simple mechanisms of limit order placement and removal without the need
for wealth inequality [14, 22]. However, in turn, one needs to explain why limit orders are
placed in such manner; the heterogeneity of time scales may provide an explanation of order
placement far away from best prices if power-law distributed [26], but additional work is
needed in order to explain order placement near best prices, which causes these large price
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moves. Finally, a recent simple model of investment with leverage is able to reproduce some
stylized facts [36].
But mechanisms alone may not be sufficient to replicate the full complexity of financial
markets, as some part of it may lie instead in the heterogeneity of the agents themselves.
While the need for heterogeneous agents in this context is intuitive (see e.g. [2]), there is no
easily available data against which to test or to validate microscopically an agent-based model.
Even if it is relatively easy to design agent-based models that reproduce some of the stylized
facts of financial markets (see e.g [27, 10, 9, 13, 1]), one never knows if this is achieved for
good reasons, except for volatility clustering [6]: it is to be expected that real traders behave
sometimes at odds with one’s intuition. Thus, without data about the traders themselves, one
is left with the often frustrating and time-consuming task of reverse-engineering the market in
order to determine the good ingredients indirectly. Some progresses have been made recently
with the analysis of transactions in Spanish stock market aggregated by brokers [37], hence
with mesoscale resolution.
Data on trader behavior is found in the files of brokers, usually shrouded in secrecy. But
this lack of data accessibility is not entirely to blame for the current ignorance of real-trader
dynamics: researchers, even when given access to broker data, have focused on trading gains
and behavioral biases, often with factor-based analyses (see e.g. [3, 4, 20]).
We aim at providing a coherent picture of how various types of traders behave and interact,
making it possible for agent-based models to rest on a much more solid basis. This paper is the
first of a series that will establish stylized facts about trader characteristics and behavior. One
of the most important aspects of these papers will be to characterize the heterogeneity of the
traders in all respects (account value, turnover, trading frequency, behavioral biases, etc.) and
the relationships between these quantities in probability distribution, not with factors. This
paper is first devoted to the description of the large data set that we use; it then focuses on
the relationship between trader account value, turnover per transaction and transaction costs,
both empirically and theoretically. We will show that while the traders have a spontaneous
tendency to build equally-weighted portfolios, the number of stocks in a portfolio increases
non-linearly with their account value, which we link to portfolio optimisation and broker
transaction fee structure.
2 Description of the data
Our data are extracted from the database of the largest Swiss on-line broker, Swissquote Bank SA
(further referred to as Swissquote). The sample contains comprehensive details about all the
19 million electronic orders sent by 120’000 professional and non-professional on-line traders
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from January 2003 to March 2009. Of these orders, 65% have been canceled or have expired
and 30% have been filled; the remaining 5% percent were still valid as of the 31st of March
2009. Since this study focuses on turnover as a function of account value, we chose to exclude
orders for products that allow traders to invest more than their account value, also called
leveraging, i.e., orders to margin-calls markets such as the foreign exchange market (FOREX)
and the derivative exchange EUREX. The resulting sample contains 50% of orders for deriva-
tives, 40% for stocks, and 4% for bonds and funds. Finally, 70% of these orders were sent to
the Swiss market, 20% to the German market and about 10% to the US market.
Swissquote clients consist of three main groups: individuals, companies, and asset managers.
Individual traders, also referred to as retail clients, are mainly non-professional traders acting
for their own account. The accounts of companies are usually managed by individuals trading
on behalf of a company and, as we shall see, behave very much like retail clients, albeit with a
larger typical account value. Finally, asset managers manage accounts of individuals and/or
companies, some of them dealing with more than a thousand clients; their behavior differ
markedly from that of the other two categories of clients.
3 Results
3.1 Account values
Numerous studies have been devoted to the analysis and modeling of wealth dynamics and
distribution among a population (see [40] and references therein). The general picture is
that in a population, a very large majority lies in the exponential part of the reciprocal
cumulative distribution function, while the wealth of the richest people is Pareto-distributed,
i.e., according to a power-law.
The account value of Swissquote traders is by definition the sum of all their assets (cash,
stock, bonds, derivatives, funds, deposits), and denoted by Pv. In order to simplify our
analysis, we compute Pv once per day after US markets close and take this value as a proxy
for the next day’s account value. Figure 1 displays this distribution computed at the time of
the first and last transactions of the clients. Results are shown for the three main categories
of clients. Maximum likelihood fits to the tail of the individual traders to the Pareto model
p(x) ∼ (x/xmin)−γ were performed using the BCa bootstrap method of [21] and determining
the parameter xmin by minimizing the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics as in [16]. Results are
reported in table 1.
The values of γ are in line with the wealth distribution of all major capitalistic countries
(see [34] for a possible origin of Pareto exponents between 2.3 and 2.5). Thus the retail clients
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Figure 1: Reciprocal cumulative distribution function of the portfolio value Pv for the three cat-
egories of clients at the time of their first (empty symbols) and last (filled symbols) transactions.
Several models have been fitted to the data by Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE): the Student
distribution (Pareto with plateau), the Weibull (stretched exponential), and the log-normal distribu-
tion. The best candidate, determined graphically and via bootstrapping the Kolmogorov Smirnov test
[16] was found to be the log-normal distribution, which is the only one shown here for the sake of
clarity. The dashed line in light blue results from a MLE fit to the tail of the individual traders with
the Pareto distribution p(x) ∼ (x/xmin)−γ (see section 3.1).
Table 1: Results of the fits of Pareto law (x/xmin)
γ to the account value Pv of individuals.
individuals γ xmin
first transaction 2.33 ∈ [2.29, 2.37]95 2.30 · 106 ∈ [1.99 · 106, 2.59 · 106]
last transaction 2.39 ∈ [2.33, 2.44]95 3.73 · 106 ∈ [3.15 · 106, 4.29 · 106]
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Table 2: Parameter values and 95% confidence intervals for the MLE fit of the account values to the
log-normal distribution lnN(µ, σ2). For each category of investors, the first and second row correspond
to the account value at the time of the first, respectively the last transaction (see text). Note that
portfolio values have been multiplied by an arbitrary number for confidentiality reasons. This only
affects the value of µ.
µ σ
individuals 13.94± 0.02 2.87± 0.01
14.25± 0.02 2.01± 0.01
companies 16.0± 0.2 2.0± 0.1
15.9± 0.2 2.4± 0.1
asset managers 16.7± 0.2 1.8± 0.1
16.7± 0.2 2.0± 0.1
are most probably representative of the Swiss population. The account value distributions of
companies and asset managers have no clear power-law tails, in agreement with the results
of a recent model that suggests a log-normal distribution of mutual fund asset sizes [31].
Consequently, figure 1 also reports a fit of the data to log-normal distributions lnN(µ, σ2),
which approximate more faithfully P>(Pv) than the Student and the Weibull distributions
for the three categories of clients, except its extreme tail in the case of retail clients.
3.2 Mean turnover
The turnover of a single transaction i, denoted by Ti is defined as the price paid times the
volume of the transaction and does not include transaction fees. We have excluded the
traders that have leveraged positions on stocks, hence Ti ≤ Pv; more generally one wishes
to determine how the average turnover of a given trader relates to his portfolio value. In
passing, since P (Pv) has fat tails, the only way the distribution of T can avoid having fat
tails is if the typical turnover is proportional to log(Pv). We denote by 〈T 〉 the mean turnover
per transaction for a given client over the history of his activities.
Figure 2 reports its reciprocal cumulative distributions functions (RCDF) for stocks and
derivatives for the three categories of clients; all RCDFs have a first plateau and then a fat
tail. For stocks, the tails are not a pure power laws, but they are for derivatives. Indeed, fitting
the RCDFs with Weibull, log-normal and Zipf-Mandelbrot distribution with an exponential
cut-off, defined as
F
(1)
> (x) =
cγe−βx
(c+ x)γ
, (1)
clearly shows that the latter is the only one that does not systematically underestimate the
tail of the RCDF for stocks; estimated values of β and γ given in table 3.
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(a) Stocks (b) Derivatives
Figure 2: Reverse cumulative distribution function of the mean turnover per transaction for the
three categories of clients, and for both stock and derivative transactions. In the insets, the tail part
of the RCDF of 〈Tnorm〉 = 〈T 〉 /mean(〈T 〉). The solid curves are maximum likelihood fits to (1) for
stocks and (2) for derivatives. The dotted lines are fits to the Weibull distribution and the dashed
lines to the log-normal distribution.
The RCDFs related to the turnover of transactions on derivative products have clearer power-
law tails for retail clients, which we fitted with a standard Zipf-Mandelbrot function, defined
as
F
(2)
> (x) =
cγ
(c+ x)γ
. (2)
The parameters estimated are to be found in table 3; because of the power-law nature of this
tail, fits with Weibull and log-normal distributions are not very good in the tails. While the
decision process that allocates a budget to each type of product may be essentially the same,
the buying power is larger for derivative products, which may explain the absence of a cut-off.
Fits for companies and asset managers is very difficult and mostly non-conclusive because of
unsufficient sample size; the good quality of the tail collapse (see inset) tends to indicate that
the three distributions are identical, but we could not fit the RCDF of companies and asset
managers with (2); as reported in figure 2b, log-normal distributions are adequate choices in
these cases; since the quality of the fits are poor, we do not report the resulting parameters.
Table 3: Results of the maximum likelihood fit of P>(〈T 〉) with (1) and (2) for the three categories
of clients. The 95% confidence intervals reported in smaller character are computed by the biased-
corrected accelerated (BCa) bootstrap method of [21].
Stocks (1) Derivatives (2)
γ β · 10−6 γ
individuals 1.97 0.98 1.98
[1.83,2.10] [0.46,1.5] [1.91,2.15]
companies 1.29 1.66 -
[1.52,1.89] [0.44,2.3]
asset managers 1.93 0.91 -
[1.47,2.93] [-7.8,4.5]
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Figure 3: Density plot of the average log T vs the average logPv, robust non-parametric fit (red
line), and linear fits (dashed lines)
3.3 Mean turnover vs account value
The relationship between 〈T 〉 vs 〈Pv〉 is important as it dictates what fraction of their in-
vestable wealth the traders exchange in markets. We first produce a scatter plot of 〈log T 〉 vs
〈logPv〉 (figure 4). In a log-log scale plot, it shows a cloud of points that is roughly increasing.
A density plot is however clearer for retail clients as there are many more points (figure 3).
These plots make it clear that there are simple relationships between log T and logPv. A
robust non-parametric regression method [17] reveals a double linear relationship between
〈log T 〉 and 〈logPv〉 for all three categories of investors (see figures 4 and 3):
〈log T 〉 = βx 〈logPv〉+ ax (3)
where x = 1 when 〈logPv〉 < Θ1 and x = 2 when 〈logPv〉 > Θ2. Fitted values with confidence
intervals are reported in table 5.
This result is remarkable in two respects: (i) the double linear relation, not obvious to the
naked eye, separates investors into two groups (ii) the ranges of values where the transition
occurs is very similar across the three categories of traders.
The relationships above only applies to averages over all the agents. This means that there
are some intrinsic quantities that make all the agents deviate from this average line. Detailed
examination of the regression residuals show that the latter are for the most part (i.e. more
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(a) (b)
Figure 4: Density plot of the average log T vs the average logPv, robust non-parametric fit (red
line), and linear fits (dashed lines)
Table 5: Parameter values and 95% confidence intervals for the double linear model (4). For each
category of investors, the first and second row correspond respectively to 〈logPv〉 ≤ Θ1 an 〈logPv〉 ≥
Θ2. For confidentiality reasons, we have multiplied Pv and T by a random number. This only affects
the true values of ax and Θ in the table.
βx ax ξ Θ R
2
individuals 0.84± 0.02 0.73± 1.25 0.71 14 0.52
0.54± 0.01 5.07± 0.15 0.77 14.5 0.40
companies 0.81± 0.13 1.12± 8.17 0.88 15.5 0.47
0.50± 0.07 5.82± 1.65 1.00 15.6 0.33
asset managers 0.89± 0.20 −0.31± 0.76 0.62 15.5 0.52
0.63± 0.08 3.28± 5.78 0.62 16.5 0.46
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than 95%) normally distributed with constant standard deviations ξx and that the residuals
deviating from the normal distributions are not fat-tailed. This directly suggests the simple
relation for individual traders
T i = eax+δ
iax(P iv)
βx ≤ eΘx (4)
where T i and P iv are respectively the turnover and portfolio value of investor i, and δ
iax are
i.i.d. N(0, ξ2x) idiosyncratic variations independent from Pv that mirror the heterogeneity of
the agents. As we shall see, portfolio optimization with heterogeneous parameters yields this
precise relationship.
3.4 Turnover rescaled by account value
Let us now measure the typical fraction of wealth exchanged in a single transaction, defined
as Q =
〈
T
Pv
〉
. Since the inverse of this ratio is an indirect (and imperfect) proxy of the
number N of assets that a trader owns, it also indicates how well diversified his investments
are, hence, it can be viewed a simple proxy of the risk profiles of the agents.
3.4.1 data
Figure 5 shows that the distributions look exponential to a naked eye for about 90% of the
individuals and nearly 80% of the companies, while that of the asset managers is rapidly
more complex that a simple exponential. We derive exact relationships for this quantity in
subsection 3.4.2 that show that these distributions are in fact not exponential but log-normal.
The resulting picture is that only a small fraction of customers trade a large fraction of
their wealth on average. Interestingly, these figures show a clear difference between the
three categories of clients. As discussed above, figure 5 roughly reflects the risk profile of
the different types of customers: less than 10% of asset managers trade on average more
than 20% of their clients’ capital in a single transaction; this rises to 30% for companies,
and 45% for retail clients. Note however that despite the fact that the account values of
companies and asset managers are comparable, companies tend to have a Q closer to that
of the individuals; this suggests either that companies hold a smaller N than asset managers
for the same account value, or that asset managers tend to make smaller adjustments to the
quantities of assets.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5: Reverse cumulative distribution function of Q =
〈
T
Pv
〉
, the mean ratio of the turnover over
the portfolio value for individual traders (black), companies (red) and asset managers (green). Left
plot is in lin-log scale and right plot is in log-lin scale. Solid lines come from theoretical predictions
of section 3.4.2.
3.4.2 theory
Since we know the distributions of T , Pv and their relationship, we are in a position to
derive analytical expressions for Qi =
〈
T (t)
Pv(t)
〉
of investor i. The distribution of Q across the
population of on-line investors can be easily found using (4) and the distribution of Pv. Let
PT,Pv(t, pv) denote the joint distribution of T and Pv:
PQ= T
Pv
(q) =
ˆ ∞
0
pvPT,Pv(qpv, pv) dpv =
ˆ ∞
0
pvPT |Pv(qpv|pv)PPv(pv) dpv. (5)
Let us now assume for the sake of clarity that T = ea+δaP βv . Given Pv, the turnover T follows
a log-normal distribution with mean log pv + a and variance ξ
2. Substituting PT |Pv(t|pv) =
lnN
(
log pv + a, ξ
2
)
in (5) leads after some simplifications to
PQ(q) =
ˆ ∞
0
1√
2piξ2q
exp
−
(
log(qp1−βv )− a
)2
2ξ2
PPv(pv) dpv, (6)
and
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FQ(q) =
ˆ q
0
PQ(x) dx =
ˆ ∞
0
1
2
erfc
(
a− log(qp1−βv )√
2ξ
)
PPv(pv) dpv, (7)
where erfc(x) = 2√
pi
´∞
x e
−y2 dy is the complementary error function. As expected, when β = 0
(i.e. T and Pv are independent), we recover the product of the two marginal distributions. On
the other hand, when β = 1, i.e., when T is proportional to Pv, PQ(q) = lnN
(
a, ξ2
)
, which
is the distribution of the factor ea+δa. For other values of β the functions PQ and FQ cannot
be determined analytically unless PPv takes a particular form as shown below. However, the
moments of PQ(q) can be arranged in a simpler form:
E(qn) =
ˆ ∞
0
qnPQ(q)dq = e
na+ 1
2
n2ξ2
ˆ ∞
0
1
p
n(1−β)
v
PPv(pv) dpv, (8)
that is, the (log-normal) moments of T/Pv times an integral term smaller or equal to 1
(because in practice PPv(pv) > 1)
1. Hence, the relation E(qn) ≤ ena+ 12n2ξ2 with equality
when β = 1 holds for any distribution of the account value Pv.
In section 3.1, we have shown that the distribution of Pv is well-approximated by a log-
normal distribution. This particular choice of distribution makes the previous integrals
analytically tractable. Indeed, with PPv = lnN(µ, σ
2) straight integration of (6) leads to
PQ = lnN(M,S
2), where M = a − (1 − β)µ and S2 = ξ2 + (1 − β)2σ2. This simple result
has some practical interest: given the distribution parameters and the coupling factor β, one
can draw realistic q factors for agent-based modeling as Q = eM+SX , where X is N (0, 1)
distributed. Furthermore, in the next section, we show how the value of β may be inferred
from the transaction cost structure, which decreases the number of parameters to four.
Figure 5 confirms the validity of the above theoretical results, once expanded to the case of
a bi-linear relation between T and Pv. It is noteworthy that the continuous lines are no fits
on empirical q factors, but use instead the results of the separate fits on the turnover and
account distributions.
4 The influence of transaction costs on trading behavior: optimal mean-variance
portfolios
Apart from risk profiles, education, and typical wealth, the differences in the turnover as a
function of wealth observed above between the three populations of traders may also lie in the
1Mathematically, all the moments of Q always exist since β ≤ 1 and Pv(pv) must decay faster than p−1v to
be a valid distribution.
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Figure 6: Swissquote fee curve for the Swiss stock market. Commissions based on a sliding scale of
costs are common practice in the world of on-line finance. The red line results from a non-linear fit
to equation 10. Parameter values are C = 0.13 ∈ [0.05, 0.5]95 and δ = 0.63 ∈ [0.5, 0.74]95, where the
95% confidence intervals are obtained from the BCa bootstrap method of [21].
difference of their actual transaction cost structure. Swissquote current standard structure
for the Swiss market (its shape is very similar for European and US markets) is shown in
figure 6; it is a piece-wise constant, non-linear looking function. Fitting all segments to
equation 10 gives δ = 0.63 ∈ [0.5, 0.74]95. The fee structure of most brokers is not set in
stone and can be negotiated. A frequent request is to have a flat fee, i.e. a fixed cost per
transaction corresponding to a constant function. Since quite clearly the negotiation power of
large clients or of clients that carry out many transactions is more important, asset managers
are more likely to obtain a more favorable fee structure than basic retail clients.
Since buying some shares of an asset is the result of unconscious or calculated portfolio
construction process, one first needs a theoretical reference point with which to compare the
population characteristics as measured in the previous subsection. In other words, we shall
use results from portfolio optimization theory with non-linear transaction cost functions to
understand the results of the previous subsection.
Quite curiously, all analytical papers in the literature on optimal portfolios either neglect
transaction costs or assume constant or linear transaction cost structures; non-linear struc-
tures are tackled numerically; thus, we incorporate the specific non-linear transaction cost
structure faced by the traders under investigation in the classic one-shot portfolio optimiza-
tion problem studied by Brennan [8], who restricted its discussion to fees proportional to the
number of securities, in other words, a flat fee per transaction.
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Building optimal mean-variance stock portfolios consists for a given agent in selecting which
stock to invest in and in what proportion by maximizing the expected portfolio growth,
usually called return, while trying to reduce the resulting a priori risk. One cost function
that corresponds to such requirements is
Lλ(R) = λE(R)-Var(R), (9)
where R is the stochastic return of the portfolio over the investment horizon (e.g., one month,
one year) and λ tunes the trade-off between risk and return; as such, it can be interpreted
as a measure of an investor’s attitude towards risk: the larger λ , the more risk-adverse the
investor.
The return of the portfolio can be decomposed into contributions from risky assets (stocks,
derivatives, etc.), the interests of the amount kept in cash, and the total relative cost of broker
commission, which we denote as R = Rrisky +Rcash −Rcost. Mathematically,
• Rrisky = ΣNi=1xiRi, where Ri is the return of stock i over this horizon, xi is the fraction
of the total wealth invested in this stock, and N is the total number of investable assets;
we shall denote the total fraction of wealth invested in risky assets by x =
∑N
i=1 xi;
• Rcash = (1− x)r, where r is the interest rate;
• Rcost =
∑N
i=1 F (xiPv)
Pv
(1 + r), where F (x) is the amount charged by a broker to exchange
an amount x of cash into shares or vice-versa.
The focus of this section is to derive explicit relationships between F , the number of assets
to hold in a portfolio, and the account value Pv. Whereas previous works only considered
special cases for F that are not compatible with the fees structure of Swissquote, we need to
introduce a cost function that can accommodate all the standard broker commission schemes.
The two extreme cases are i) flat-fee per transaction, i.e., a fixed cost that does not depend on
the amount exchanged ii) a proportional scheme, possibly with a maximum fee. Swissquote’s
standard scheme stands in between and is well approximated by a power-law with a maximum
fee Fmax. We hence choose
F (xiPv) = min
(
C(xiPv)
δ, Fmax
)
, (10)
where δ interpolates between a flat-fee (δ = 0), as in [8], and a proportional scheme (δ = 1)
via a power-law, and C is a constant.
Following the well-known one-factor model of Sharpe [32], we assume that the return of asset
i follows the global market’s return RM with an idiosyncratic proportionality factor βi. More
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specifically,
Ri = βi(RM − r) + r + εi, (11)
where εi is an uncorrelated white noise E(εi) = E(εiεj) = E(RMεi) = 0. This equation
means that the systematic idiosyncratic part of Ri only applies to the return above the
risk-free interest rate, also called market risk premium.
This completely specifies the functional Lλ. Returning to (9), one first computes the expec-
tation and variance of the portfolio return:
E(R) =
N∑
i=1
xiE(Ri) + (1− x)r −
∑N
i=1 F (xiPv)
Pv
(1 + r),
= (E(RM )− r)
N∑
i=1
xiβi + r − (1 + r)C
P 1−δv
N∑
i=1
xδi , (12)
and
Var(R) = Var(Rrisky)
= Var(RM )
N∑
i=1
(xiβi)
2 +
N∑
i=1
x2iVar(εi). (13)
Note that, since here the risk-free rate is non-random, the portfolio variance is independent
of both the risk-free investment and broker commission; this does not hold for the expected
return.
In principle, the functional L depends on N , the number of assets in the portfolio, λ the
risk parameter, and xi the fraction of account value to invest in risky product i. Assuming
that xi is constant for all i (i.e. equally-weighted allocation), we are left with only three
parameters since xi = x/N . Thus, from the optimization of the resulting functional one can
obtain a relationship between any two of these parameters. We are mostly interested in N
as a function of x.
4.1 Non-linear relationship between account value and number of assets
We will first assume that agents seek the optimal fraction of their account value x∗ to invest
in N securities—N being known—given the risk free rate r and broker commission F (xiW ).
The optimal solution is simply obtained by setting xi = x/N in (12) and (13), and by equating
to zero the derivative of (9) with respect to x. This leads to the following transcendental
equation for x∗:
x∗ =
λ
2
β¯(E(RM )− r)− δ(1 + r)C( Nx∗Pv )1−δ
β¯2Var(RM ) +
1
NVar(ε)
, (14)
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where β¯ = 1N
∑N
i=1 βi and Var(ε) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 Var(εi) is the mean idiosyncratic volatility.
Provided the investor risk tolerance λ has been reliably estimated, which is usually a complex
task [39], and that Sharpe model is adequate, (14) can be used directly in a real-world portfolio
optimization problem. The βi and εi are then obtained by regressing the returns of all the
stocks with (11); the optimal solution is expected to be reliable in the absence of significant
residual correlations between εi and εj . In the more common situation where λ is unknown,
one can derive a second equation for the optimal number of securities under the assumption
that portfolios are sufficiently homogeneous, or that the investment horizon is long enough
so as to have β¯ and Var(ε) independent from N . As shown in figure 7, β¯ on the US stock
market is persistently close to one for various time horizons and values of N , consistently
with the homogeneous assumption. Taking a few technical precautions into account ([8]), the
differentiation of the Lagrangian (9) with respect to N leads to
λ =
Var(ε)P 1−δv
(1− δ)C(1 + r) (N∗x )2−δ , (15)
where it is assumed that δ < 1 since for δ = 1 the optimum investment does not depend on
N through the cost function. According to (15), the agent risk tolerance increases with their
account value Pv, in agreement with various survey studies on the risk tolerance of actual
investors (see the literature review of [38]). Using (14) and (15) to get rid of λ, we obtain
N2−δ
(
1 +
δ
1− δ
K
N
)
= K
β¯(E(RM )− r)
(1− δ)C(1 + r) (xPv)
1−δ , (16)
where K is the ratio of residual risk to market risk defined as
K = 2
(
β¯2Var(RM )
Var(ε)
+
1
N
)−1
≈
N1
2
Var(ε)
β¯2Var(RM )
. (17)
Given the desired level of systematic risk x, (16) can be solved for N numerically in an actual
portfolio optimization. Further insight is gained by considering the high diversification limit
N  1, which yields 1 + δ1−δ KN ≈ 1 in (16) and thus
N =
(
K
β¯(E(RM )− r)
(1− δ)C(1 + r)
) 1
2−δ
(xPv)
1−δ
2−δ , (18)
where K is given by the right-hand side of (17). The latter equation generalizes [8] to the
case of a varying cost impact represented here by the parameter δ (i.e. the result of [8] is
recovered by setting δ = 0 and βi = 1 in (18)). These results can be further generalized to
non-equally weighted portfolios by differentiating (9) with respect to xi and assuming again
an homogeneous condition for the βis.
In essence, (18) says that the number of securities held in an equally-weighted mean-variance
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portfolio with Sharpe-like returns is related to the amount invested as
log(N) =
1− δ
2− δ log(xPv) + κ (19)
in the high diversification limit, where κ is the pre-factor of (xPv)
1−δ
2−δ in (18). The last equa-
tion gives N as a function of Pv for a predefined x in the optimal portfolio. The heterogeneity
of the traders, beyond their account value, is not apparent yet, but may occur both in x and
κ: first each trader may have his own preference regarding the fraction of this account to
invest in risky assets, x; therefore one should replace x by xi; next, κ includes both a term
related to transaction costs, which does vary from trader to trader, and some measures and
expectation of market returns and variance; each trader may have his own perception or way
of measuring them, hence κ should also be replaced by κi. Finally, both terms can be merged
in the same constant term ζi = 1−δ2−δ log(x
i) + κi. This explains how the heterogeneity of the
traders is the cause of fluctuations in the kind of relationships we are interested in.
5 Turnover, number of assets and account value
The result above only links N with Pv, but one also wishes to obtain relationships that involve
the turnover per transaction, T . Whereas in section 3, we have characterized the turnover
of any transaction, the results of section 4 rest on the assumption that the agents build
their portfolio by selecting a group of assets and stick to them over a period of time. This,
obviously, does not include the possibility of speculating by a series of buy and sell trades
on even a single asset, nor portfolio rebalancing which consists in adjusting the relative
proportions of some assets. We thus have to find a way to differentiate between portfolio
building, rebalancing and speculation. Here, we shall focus on portfolio building in order to
test and link the results of section 4 to those of section 3.
We have found a simple effective method that can separate portfolio-building transactions
from the other ones: we assume that the transactions of trader i that correspond to the
building of his portfolio are restricted the first transaction of assets not traded previously;
sell orders are ignored, since Swissquote clients cannot short sell easily. In other words, if
trader i owns some shares of assets A, B, and C and then buys some shares of asset D, the
corresponding transaction is deemed to contribute to his portfolio building process; the set of
such transactions is denoted by Φi, while the full set of transactions is denoted by Ωi. Any
subsequent transaction of shares of assets A, B, C, or D are left out of Φi. The number of
different assets that trader i owns is supposed to be Ni ' |Φi| where |X| is the cardinal of
set X; this approach assumes that a trader always owns shares in all the assets ever traded;
surprisingly, this is by large the most common case. We shall drop the index i from now on.
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Figure 7: Box-plot of empirical βs obtained from the regression of several US stocks on the S&P500.
The observation period covers 2001 to 2008 and returns are computed on various time horizons ∆t
(in days). Results show that β¯ = 1N
∑N
i=1 βi ≈ 1 for all values of ∆t and (even small) N , consistently
with the homogeneous assumption of section 4.1.
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Figure 8: Turnover of transactions contributing to the building of a portfolio TΦ versus the number
N of assets held by a given trader at the time of the transaction. Green lines: non-parametric fit; red
lines: fits of the linear part of the non-parametric fit. From left to right: companies, asset managers,
and individuals.
Let us now focus on TΦ =
∑
k∈Φ Tk, the total turnover that helped building his portfolio. We
should first check how it is related to the total portfolio value Pv. Let us define 〈Pv〉Φ, the ac-
count value of a trader averaged at the times at which he trades a new asset.Plotting log 〈Pv〉Φ
against log TΦ gives a cloudy relationship, as usual, but the fitting it with log 〈Pv〉Φ = χ log TΦ
gives χ = 1.03± 0.02 for individuals, χ = 0.99± 0.02 for asset managers and χ = 1.00± 0.01
for companies with an adjusted R2 = 0.99 in all cases. This relationship trivially holds for
the traders who buy all their assets at once, as assumed in the portfolio model. The traders
who do not lie on this line either hold positions in cash (in which case this line is a lower
bound), or do not build their portfolio in a single day: they pile up positions in derivative
products or stocks whose price fluctuations are the origin of the devations from the line. But
the fact that the slope is close to 1 means that the average fluctuation is zero, hence, that on
average trades do not make money from the positions taken on new stocks. The consequence
of this is that logPv can be replaced by log TΦ in (19), thus, setting x = 1,
logN =
1− δ
2− δ log TΦ + κ (20)
The x = 1 assumption is in fact quite reasonable: most Swissquote traders do not use their
trading account as savings accounts and are fully invested; we do not know what amount
they keep on their other bank accounts.
A robust non-parametric fit does reveal a linear relationship between logN and log TΦ in a
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Table 6: Slope α linking log TΦ and logN for the three trader categories.
individuals companies asset managers
α 0.52± 0.02 0.36± 0.14 0.44± 0.13
log TΦ ∈ [16, 19] [17, 19.8] [15.8, 18]
Table 7: Results of the double linear regression of log 〈T 〉Φ versus log 〈Pv〉Φ. For each category
of investors, the first and second row correspond respectively to log 〈Pv〉Φ ≤ Θ1 an log 〈Pv〉Φ ≥ Θ2,
where Θ1,2 have been determined graphically using the non-parametric method of [17] as in section 3.3.
Parameters are as in the double linear model (4). For confidentiality reasons, we have multiplied Pv
and T by a random number, which only affects the true values of Θ1,2 and of the ordinate ax.
βx ax ξ Θ R
2
individuals 0.85± 0.02 0.71± 0.16 0.65 14.5 0.59
0.51± 0.01 5.62± 0.17 0.76 15 0.31
companies 0.83± 0.17 1.03± 2.47 0.86 15.5 0.42
0.62± 0.14 3.99± 2.55 0.93 17 0.32
asset managers 0.84± 0.25 0.45± 3.77 0.79 15.95 0.50
0.73± 0.17 1.72± 3.23 0.72 18 0.41
given region (N,TΦ) ∈ Γ (figure 8). In this region, we have
logN = α log TΦ + β, (21)
which gives
α =
1− δ
2− δ . (22)
We still need to link 〈T 〉Φ and 〈Pv〉βΦ. While section 3 showed that the unconditional averages
lead to 〈T 〉 ∼ 〈Pv〉β, one also finds that 〈T 〉Φ ∼ 〈Pv〉βΦ. Therefore, one can write
log 〈T 〉Φ = β log 〈Pv〉Φ + cst. (23)
Thus, one is finally rewarded with the missing link
β =
1
2− δ , (24)
which directly involves the transaction cost structure in the relationship between turnover
and portfolio value, as argued in section 32. This relationship allows us to close the loop
as we are now able to relate directly the exponents linking T , N , and Pv. Going back to
2Note that this relationship can be obtained directly by assuming that all the transactions happen at the
same time, hence that T = (xPv)/N , which leads straightforwardly to (24).
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section 3, one understands that the existence of a bi-linear relationship between log-turnover
and log-account value, i.e., of two values of β for each of the three categories of clients, is
linked to two values of δ: a flat flee structure or the disregard for transaction costs leads to
β = 12 , while proportional fees (δ = 1) give β = 1.
Let us finally discuss the empirical values of α, β, and δ against their theoretical counterparts,
which is summarized in table 8.
1. Small values of TΦ: it was impossible to measure α in that case since the non-parametric
fit shows a non-linear relationship in the log-log plot for retail clients, which we trust
more since they have many many more points than the graphs for the two other cate-
gories of clients. But it may not make sense to expect a linear relationship since such a
relationship is only expected for N large enough (N ≥ 10 in practice) and a small TΦ
is related to a small N . Thus we can only test β = 1/(2− δ). The reported value of β
is consistent accross all the clients. Retail clients have a larger δeff = 2 − 1β that the
estimated δSQ. Since the shape of the fee structure is discontinuous, the values of these
exponents can hardly be expected to match. However, fitting the whole curve structure
may be problematic in this context: indeed, the traders with a typical small value of
TΦ see a more linear relationship in the region of small transaction value that when
considering the whole curve; for instance, removing the two largest segments from the
fee structure yields δ′SQ = 0.74 ∈ [0.43, 0.79], which is not far of δeff .
2. Large values of TΦ: the relationships between all the exponents are verified for the three
categories of clients. While not very impressive for companies and asset managers, this
result is much stronger in the case of retail clients since the relative uncertainties associ-
ated with each measured exponent are small (1-2%). The value of βretail is of particular
interest as it corresponds δeff = 0, or equivalently, to a flat fee structure. Going back
to the fees structure of Swissquote, one finds that that the transition happens when the
relative transaction cost falls below some threshold (we cannot give its precise value
for confidentiality reasons; it is smaller than 1%). A possible explanation is that either
some traders with a high enough average turnover have a flat-fee agreement with Swis-
squote and that the rest of them simply act as if they were not able to take correctly
into account transaction costs. Since not all traders have a flat-fee aggrement, one must
conclude that some traders have indeed some problems estimating small relative fees
and simply disregard them. The reported value of β for companies and asset managers
is larger that βretail, but it is more likely than not that the small sample size is respon-
sible for this discrepancy, since these two categories of clients have a greater propensity
to negociate a flat-fee structure.
3. Transition between the two regimes: the transitions between the standard Swissquote
and an effective flat-fee structure happens occur at the same average value of T for the
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Table 8: Table summarising the empirical and theoretical relationships between α, β, and δ.
small Tφ individuals companies asset managers
β 0.85± 0.02 0.83± 0.17 0.84± 0.25
log TΦ < 14.5 17 18
δeff = 2− 1β 0.82± 0.02 0.80± 0.20 0.81± 0.30
δSQ 0.63 ∈ [0.50, 0.74] 0.63 ∈ [0.50, 0.74] 0.63 ∈ [0.50, 0.74]
δ′SQ 0.74 ∈ [0.43, 0.79] 0.74 ∈ [0.43, 0.79] 0.74 ∈ [0.43, 0.79]
β˜ = 12−δSQ 0.73 ∈ [0.66, 0.74] 0.73 ∈ [0.66, 0.74] 0.73 ∈ [0.66, 0.74]
large Tφ individuals companies asset managers
β 0.51± 0.01 0.62± 0.14 0.73± 0.17
log TΦ > 15 17 18
δeff = 2− 1β 0.04± 0.02 0.39± 0.23 0.63± 0.23
αeff =
1−δeff
2−δeff 0.49± 0.01 0.38± 0.09 0.27± 0.08
α 0.52± 0.02 0.36± 0.14 0.44± 0.13
log TΦ ∈ [16, 19] [17, 19.8] [15.8, 18]
three categories of traders (idem for TΦ). Since there is no automatic switching between
fee structures at Swissquote for any predefined value of transaction value, one is lead
to conclude that this transition has behavioural origins, which is also responsible for
the value at which the transition takes place which, in passing, corresponds to the end
of the plateau of the RCDF of Pv in the case of retail clients (e
15 ' 3.27 · 106). As a
consequence, it is likely that the traders tend to either neglect or consider as constant
transaction fees smaller than some threshold when they build their portfolio.
6 Discussion and outlook
We have been able to determine empirically a bilinear relationship between the average log-
turnover and the average log-account value and have argued that it comes from the transaction
fee structure of the broker and its perception by the agents. A theoretical derivation of
optimal simple one-shot mean-variance portfolios with non-linear transaction costs predicted
relationships between turnover, number of different asset in the portfolio and log-account
values that could be verified empirically. This means that the populations of traders do take
correctly on average, i.e. collectively, the transaction costs into account and act collectively
as mean-variance equally-weighted portfolio optimizers. This is not to say that each trader
is a mean-variance optimizer, but that the population taken as a whole behaves as such—
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with differences across populations, as discussed in the previous section. This to be related
to findings of Kirman’s famous work on demand and offer average curves in Marseille’s fish
market [24] and more generally as what has become known as the wisdom of the crowds
(see [35] for an easy-to-read account).
The fact that the turnover depends in a non-linear way on the account value implies that
linking the exponents of the distributions of transaction volume, buying power of large players
in financial markets, and price return is more complex that previously thought [23]. It has
also implications for agent-based models, which from now on must take into account the fact
that the real traders do invest into a number of assets that depends non-linearly on their
wealth.
Future research will address the relationship between account value and trading frequency,
which is of utmost importance to understand if the many small trades of small investors have
a comparable influence on financial market than those of institutional investors. This will
give an understanding of whom provides liquidity and what all the non-linear relationships
found above mean in this respect. This is also crucial in agent-based models, in which one
often imposes such relationship by hand, arbitrarily; reversely, one will be able to validate
evolutionary mechanisms of agent-based model according to the relationship between trading
frequency, turnover, number of assets and account value they achieve in their steady state.
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